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Transformations of the energy system are unfolding in China at an unprecedented
scale and pace. The dynamics of China's energy transitions impact global trends
of energy decarbonisation. Transition theories within the Anglophone academic
tradition have been used to examine this process, but they tend to misrepresent
the social, cultural, and political structures that shape energy transitions in China.
This paper proposes a move from an analysis of energy transitions “with Chinese
characteristics” to alternative thinking on energy transitions truly rooted in Chi-
nese epistemological and philosophical constructs. The correlative epistemology
refers to a Chinese tradition of social studies that describes the cosmos as a struc-
tured order of relations (guanxi). This tradition sees guanxi as the fundamental
constituent of Chinese society. Such a relational focus enables a culture‐led read-
ing of China's energy transitions, thus responding to calls for transition theories
“from elsewhere.” In particular, correlative interpretations of innovation and tran-
sition processes in China frame energy transitions within broader societal transfor-
mations, define the operation of transition governance, and reveal that pre‐
existing guanxi networks shape the activities of actors in transition processes.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
In September 2020, Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China (PRC), surprised an audience of world leaders
at the virtual United Nations General Assembly by pledging that the country would become carbon neutral before 2060
(Mallapaty, 2020). The announcement anticipates a radical transformation of production and consumption in the country
with the largest relative contribution to the global total GHG emissions (Janssens‐Maenhout et al., 2019). This transforma-
tion will be diverse, depending on the varied trajectories of Chinese provinces and their impact on local economies and
populations (Fang et al., 2019).
The Chinese energy transition will also have a global impact. China's global influence in energy transitions relates to
the size of its renewable energy industry – which influences global supply chains everywhere – and a growing domestic
market (REN21, 2019). China is the world's largest producer, consumer, and funder of renewable energy (Cao et al.,
2018). China's commitment to carbon neutrality anticipates a ramp‐up of renewable energy production and carbon intensity
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improvements (Mallapaty, 2020). Such a transition will require massive infrastructure changes in all sectors, not only
energy (IEA, 2020).
The Chinese energy transition has become an object of great interest in academic research. China is an ancient civilisa-
tion that has maintained continuity for more than 5000 years. The size, diversity, and complexity of the country make it
difficult to either verify or falsify any interpretation of energy transition dynamics. As Bell puts it:
A joke about China is that one can say anything about it without getting it right. Another joke is that one can
say anything about it without getting it wrong. (2010, p. xiii)
Dominant innovation frameworks from an Anglophone tradition have analysed China's energy transitions, but they tend
to generate homogeneous conclusions. Most successful cases of energy transitions are associated with the actions of entre-
preneurs playing a leading role within a favourable selection environment, including appropriate infrastructure, limitless
market demand, and supportive policies led by a strong central government (see for instance: Quitzow, 2015; Yu & Gibbs,
2018a, 2020). Blocking mechanisms for capitalising innovation explain most failed cases, often reporting weak connections
between research entities and the industry, lack of efficient market mechanisms, or mismatches between innovation policies
and industrial demands (see for instance: Binz et al., 2012; Lai et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2016; Zou et al., 2017). Crucial
transition dynamics remain unexplained. In particular, these analyses rarely provide clear explanations about why transition
processes are evident in some places in China but not in others.
We propose a correlative epistemology to address this gap. As a theory, correlative epistemology follows a long tradi-
tion of critical social research within Chinese scholarship. The correlative epistemology presents the cosmos (and Chinese
society) as a structured order of relations: “guanxi” (Zhang, 1947). Guanxi, rather than entities, are the basic units of recog-
nition (Rošker, 2017). Correlative interpretations of innovation and transition processes in China situate energy transitions
within broader societal transformations, focusing on pre‐existing guanxi networks that shape transition processes. These
culture‐based perspectives can deliver new insights on the energy transition in China beyond dominant innovation frame-
works.
Our argument follows recent calls for developing spatial perspectives on energy transitions that engage with place‐based
frameworks for analysis. The following section situates this debate within current scholarship (Section 2) before focusing
on China as a case that can generate alternative forms of knowing. The objective is to move from a transition “with Chi-
nese characteristics” to new thinking on transitions that is truly rooted in Chinese epistemological and philosophical con-
structs. The argument unfolds in three parts, looking at the spatial dimensions of the energy transition in China (scale,
pace, and depth) (Section 3), the limitations of current frameworks to explain the energy transition in China (Section 4),
and the possibilities opened up by a culture‐led approach (Section 5).
2 | PLACE‐BASED PARTICULARITIES SHAPE ENERGY TRANSITIONS
Transition scholars have long been concerned with the limitations of current theorisations to capture place‐based dynamics.
Transitions frameworks such as the multilevel perspective (MLP) and technological innovations systems (TIS) conceptualise
transition mechanisms in relation to structuration levels or systems functions without integrating spatial dimensions. Coenen
et al. (2012) argue that transitions theory is often decontextualised, and this prevents a full analysis of the place‐based con-
ditions for successful transitions. According to Markard et al. (2012), dominant transition perspectives lack territorial sensi-
tivity.
These criticisms have raised considerable interest in situated perspectives on energy transitions, analysing how geograph-
ical, material, cultural, and historical constituents of transitions vary across locations (Sarrica et al., 2016). Bridge et al.
(2013) link energy transitions to the complexity of energy landscapes and the spatial embeddedness of energy activities.
Empirical case studies demonstrate the situated nature of energy transitions (Castán Broto, 2019). Energy transitions take
place within specific, place‐based histories and political trajectories. The policy ambitions and visions that guide transitions
are, likewise, embedded in specific socio‐political contexts.
Transitions cannot be understood independently from the settings in which they emerge. The spatial turn in transition
studies has inspired ample research on energy transitions at the urban and regional scales. This body of literature has identi-
fied specific aspects of place that influence energy transitions, ranging from the deployment of urban and regional policy,
the operation of informal localised institutions, natural resources endowments, the specialisation of local industries and tech-
nologies, to the dynamics of local market formation (Hansen & Coenen, 2015).
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Knowledge‐making processes are also geographically situated, and hence theorisations of innovation and change need to
recognise the geographies in which they emerge (Bridge, 2018). However, there has been a paucity of research examining
the provenance of the reference frameworks used to study transitions. The majority of place‐based theorisation of transitions
follows an Anglophone tradition of transition studies (e.g., Castán Broto et al., 2020) with some influence of Francophone
scholarship (e.g., Rutherford & Coutard, 2014). Current transitions thinking does not reflect the geographical plurality that
the discipline aspires to. As interest turns to understand energy transitions in lower and middle‐income countries, a suspi-
cion arises about the heritage of transitions theories and the extent to which subaltern theorisations are being silenced in
current debates. Bridge (2018) has called for theorisations of the dynamics of energy change “from elsewhere” to challenge
universalist understandings of transitions and recognise the particularities of transitions within specific geographical
contexts.
With its sizeable scholarly community, China offers opportunities to examine the application of dominant frameworks
and to unearth alternative perspectives that emerge from deeply seated scholarship on critical social sciences. We present
this argument in three steps: an outline of the spatial dimensions of China's energy transition considering available empiri-
cal evidence, a synthesis of the analysis of energy transitions with dominant theoretical frameworks, and the characterisa-
tion of an alternative response grounded on Chinese social sciences scholarship.
3 | MAPPING THE CONTOURS OF ENERGY TRANSITIONS IN CHINA:
SCALE, PACE, AND DEPTH
This section outlines the spatiality and temporality of China's energy transitions looking at scale, pace, and depth. The scale
of energy transitions refers to the material size and extent of change (Bridge et al., 2013). The pace of transitions addresses
the temporal dimension of a transition, denoting how long it takes for concrete changes to occur (Sovacool, 2016). The
depth of transitions examines the extent to which the energy system's fundamental structural changes demonstrate that the
transition is embedded into the current energy system (Geels et al., 2017). The analysis of these three dimensions demon-
strates the complexity of China's energy transitions and the need to apprehend the spatial variations that explain infrastruc-
ture deployment and organisation processes.
3.1 | Scale
Both the outcomes of China's energy transitions (e.g., production, generation, and consumption of renewables) and the
changes in resource flows (e.g., finance, knowledge, and labour) provide an estimation of its scale.
At the end of 2018, almost a third of global renewable power capacity was located in China (727 GW of an estimated
total of 2,378 GW) (REN21, 2019). According to these data, China is the top renewable producer in terms of installed
capacity, including hydropower, bio‐power, solar photovoltaics (solar PV), and wind power (Figure 1). In 2018, China con-
sumed a quarter of the global renewable energy output (excluding hydropower) (Figure 2).
In terms of industrial capacity, China has become the world's largest producer of photovoltaic panels and wind turbines.
In 2018, China accounted for 66% of global solar PV module production and 60% of cell production capacity (Andrews‐
Speed & Zhang, 2019). In 2018, the top 10 module manufacturers shipped an estimated total of 63 GW modules. Eight out
of 10 top PV suppliers and half of the top 10 wind turbine manufacturers were located in China (Figure 3).
China is the leading investor in renewable energy technologies. In 2017, China's investment in renewables reached US
$126.6 billion, accounting for the largest single share (45%) of investment worldwide, followed by Europe (15%) and the
USA (14%) (REN21, 2018). REN21 data show that the renewable energy sector provided more than 10 million jobs world-
wide, and 37% of the employment opportunities were in China. The number of patents filed for innovations in renewable
energy technologies worldwide in 2016 was 10,460, 67% of them filed by China (Our World in Data, 2017).
3.2 | Pace
As shown in Figure 4, from 2010 to 2018, China's installed capacity of solar PV increased at a rate of 80% annually, which
is more than double the world's annual growth rate. In 2018, global renewable energy consumption grew at a rate of 14%,
while renewable energy consumption in China grew by 29% (British Petroleum, 2019). In the decade up to 2017 (Fig-
ure 5), the 10‐year average growth rate of renewable energy consumption worldwide was 16%, compared to 41% in China.
These figures suggest that transitions in China are unfolding at an unprecedented speed. Construction periods for renewable
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energy projects are often counted in days in China. China's speed has become a benchmark in innovation and infrastructure
development (McKinsey & Company, 2015).
3.3 | Depth
In China, energy transitions already manifest in the physical configurations of both rural and urban areas. Hundreds of wind
turbines are erected in remote areas or coastal waters, and millions of ground‐mounted solar panels cover large areas.
Charging facilities for electric vehicles proliferate and reshape urban infrastructure networks. Energy transitions are also
embedded into the everyday life of Chinese people, who already show clear preferences for energy‐efficient appliances,
shared vehicles, and cycle lanes (Zhang et al., 2015).
Nevertheless, structural change has not accompanied the scale and pace of change. In 2018, the global average share of
renewables (excluding hydropower) in primary energy consumption was merely 4%.1 In China, the share was just above
the average level worldwide. As a comparison, in Sweden, the share of renewables (excluding hydropower) in primary
FIGURE 1 An overview of renewable power capacity by technology in 2018 (GW) and the share of China.
Source: REN21, 2019
FIGURE 2 An overview of renewable energy consumption by technology in 2018 (Mtoe) and the share of China.
Source: British Petroleum, 2019
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energy consumption increased from 6% in 2009 to 12% in 2018. A reason behind the limited structural change in China is
that the installed capacity of renewable energy has not fully translated into electricity generation. Figure 6 provides an over-
view of wind curtailment in China from 2010 to 2018. To put the numbers in perspective, the wind power capacity
FIGURE 3 Market shares of the top 10 suppliers for solar PV modules and wind turbines, 2018.
Source: REN21, 2019
FIGURE 4 The annual growth rate of installed capacity of renewable energy (2010–2018), by technology and region.
Source: calculated from data released by REN21, 2019
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abandoned in the year of 2016 alone is enough to supply the annual electricity consumption of Bangladesh (Qi et al.,
2019). The situation is similar for solar PV (State Council, 2019).
China is characterised by significant regional disparities that add additional complexity to the deepening of transitions.
Curtailment is a problem in northern regions that produce abundant renewable energy but have limited demand because
their local economies are less developed. In 2018, the share of renewables (excluding hydropower) in gross electricity con-
sumption was 22.3% in Ningxia province but merely 3.5% in Guangdong province (National Energy Administration, 2019).
Interprovincial transmission could address curtailment, but the country lacks long‐distance transmission lines (Zhao et al.,
2016).
Regions in China differ considerably in terms of resource endowments, development stages, industry specialisation, and
governance capacities. The central government addresses regional disparities through policy experimentation, injecting local
knowledge and experiences into national policy formulation (Heilmann, 2008). This approach supports pilot schemes to
FIGURE 5 Ten‐year average growth rate of renewable energy consumption (2007‐2017), by technology and region.
Source: National Energy Administration, 2019
FIGURE 6 Wind curtailment in China (2010–2018).
Source: National Energy Administration of China
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advance energy transitions, such as the “Low‐carbon City Initiative,” the “New Energy Demonstration City Program,” and
the “National Ecological Civilization Experimental Zones.” These pilots, however, are not sufficient to address the mis-
match between central government policy rhetoric and policy enforcement at the local level (Cai & Aoyama, 2018).
Analysis of the depth of transitions reveals the complexity of the unfolding dynamics, in terms of not only regional dif-
ferences but also the effectiveness of transition policies in a highly fragmented institutional system. Large‐scale changes
may lead to large‐scale waste of resources, while the pace of abandonment might be as rapid as the pace of innovation.
Explaining the geographical variability of energy transitions in China and how it influences transitions at the national and
international level is an imperative for transitions research.
4 | CURRENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF ENERGY TRANSITIONS IN CHINA
As argued above, current analyses of energy transitions in China have a limited ability to explain ongoing processes of
change. This includes dynamics of stability and change, the ambiguous role played by different actors, and the dynamics of
participation open within the country.
4.1 | Rethinking stability and change
In transition frameworks, the deep structures of society are often conceptualised as landscapes or regimes (Markard et al.,
2012). A landscape is viewed as an exogenous environment (e.g., cultural patterns or demographic trends) that lies beyond
the direct influence of actors (Geels, 2005). Sociotechnical regimes consist of interconnected elements between technology
and social and material structures (e.g., regulative frameworks, markets, technologies, material artefacts) that constantly
reinforce each other to create a fluid form of resistance to change (Geels, 2005). In transition theories, both concepts
assume institutionalised temporal stability (Markard et al., 2012). However, when looking at the economic and socio‐
political backdrop of China's energy transitions, stability and consistency are not the dominant tones. Sociotechnical sys-
tems in China do not look stable because they are in fact in continuous flux.
China has undergone both rapid and deep transformations within a period of just 70 years since the establishment of the
People's Republic of China in 1949. Political systems, institutions, the material arrangements of cities, infrastructure sys-
tems, and society's demographic composition have experienced dramatic changes.
Politically, China underwent turmoil during the Maoist Era (1949–1978). The decade‐long Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution (1966–1976) paralysed the state system almost entirely. Deng Xiaoping opened a new era in 1978, the Reform
Era, moving away from the Cultural Revolution and embracing economic development. Today, China is again undergoing
political and institutional reforms. China's energy bureaucracy, for instance, has gone through profound changes in the past
decades, with several rounds of fragmentation and centralisation (Cai & Aoyama, 2018).
Industrialisation, marketisation, and globalisation shaped the decades after the Reform Era. The transition from a
planned to a market economy in the 1970s reorganised labour markets (Meng, 2000), the financial sector (Laurenceson &
Chai, 2003), the operations of state‐owned enterprises (Tylecote & Cai, 2004), and fiscal policy (Wong, 2007). China's
GDP increased from US$149.5 billion in 1978 to US$14.3 trillion in 2019 (World Bank, 2020).
Infrastructural systems, presented in the transitions literature as a semi‐durable dimension of regimes (or even more
stable “landscapes”), are also evolving rapidly. Investment into railroads, roads, buildings, piping, and other forms of mate-
rial structures has increased over the past decades (Han & Xiang, 2013). Improvements in infrastructures have enabled both
rapid urbanisation and massive internal migration. The National Bureau of Statistics of China estimated that in 2019, 61%
of the population lived in urban areas and 39% in rural areas. Only 16 years before, in 2003, that figure was reversed, with
39% of the population living in urban areas and 61% in rural areas.
China has undergone a demographic transition since the 1970s (Feng, 2011). On the one hand, China has seen a rapid
decline in its mortality, as life expectancy climbed in 2019 to an average of 76 years. On the other hand, China's fertility
decline below the replacement level – a hotly debated issue – points towards a permanent change in the life of Chinese
populations. While this decline has often been attributed to China's coercive one‐child policy, other analyses point towards
a complex array of causes in line with neighbouring countries with less coercive policies. These include the economic
boom, the rapid increase in female literacy and health, the incorporation of women into labour markets, and broader
changes in culture and social expectations (Wang et al., 2018).
Economic growth has also meant significant changes in patterns of consumption and disposable capital. Between 2015
and 2019, average household consumption grew 46% up to 27,563 RMB per household (National Bureau of Statistics,
2020). This growth was even more pronounced in rural areas, where average household consumption grew a staggering
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62% between 2015 and 2019, while in urban areas the growth was 35%. Consumption habits and lifestyles, related to eat-
ing, mobility, or household practices, changed following rising income levels, demographic shifts, urbanisation, and grow-
ing interconnectivity (Hu & Peng, 2015; Loo & Li, 2012; Schipper & Ng, 2004).
Transformations of political institutions, the economic system, the population distribution, and infrastructure configura-
tions form a dynamic backdrop of energy transitions in China. As demonstrated by Tyfield,
Contemporary China presents a case of such a rapidly and profoundly changing society, both intra‐nationally
and internationally, that it is hard, even if one attempts it, to formulate a ‘stable’ landscape that may be
unproblematically treated as exogenous. (2014, p. 587)
In this context, characterising the landscape or the regime is an arduous task. The growing body of literature on China's
energy transitions reflects this difficulty, with ambiguous, inconsistent, or even contradictory interpretations of the land-
scape and the incumbent regime. Institutions undergoing fundamental changes, such as the cadre performance evaluation
system, are described as part of the landscape (e.g., Yu and Gibbs (2018b) on solar water heating in urban China). Simi-
larly, fundamental reforms of the energy system are routinely analysed as exogenous forces, part of the landscape (e.g.,
Yuan et al. (2012) on electric power). Across the literature, a similar factor is often presented as part of different analytical
levels. For instance, the Renewable Energy Law, promulgated in 2005, was considered a landscape element in some studies
(Yu & Gibbs, 2018b; Yuan et al., 2012), but as part of the regime changes in others (Xu, 2020). Similarly, the incumbent
infrastructure was identified as a regime factor in some studies (Liu & Shiroyama, 2013; Yu & Gibbs, 2018a, 2020; Zhao
et al., 2016), but as part of the landscape in others (Yuan et al., 2012). This lack of alignment between empirical observa-
tion and analytical categories suggests that frameworks such as the multilevel perspective are limited in analyses of energy
transitions resulting from multi‐layered processes of radical change.
4.2 | Understanding actors' logics of action
The diffusion of innovation through society is conceptualised in the transitions literature as resulting from processes of
coevolution between society and technology (Geels, 2005; Kemp et al., 2007). Coevolution requires generating diversity
(innovation) through open‐ended and uncertain processes, adapting selection environments (the alignment of society with
novelty), and reducing diversity through differential replication (Safarzyńska et al., 2012). Diffusion of innovation is pro-
pelled by learning, the consolidation of industries, and the formation of actor networks and social institutions around new
technologies. This way of conceptualising society poses difficulties when understanding processes of change in China,
where a “free market” does not exist. The assumption that entrepreneurs drive novelty and foster the evolution of skill sets
and routines is therefore not appropriate.
In transition studies, coalition‐building between actor groups is considered a condition to expand processes of change.
This perspective assumes interaction between the public, private, and academic sphere or across distinct social groups (e.g.,
public authorities, supply chains, users) (Geels, 2005). This idea is especially influential in theories of reflexive governance
(Voss et al., 2006), later developed in the transition management literature (Frantzeskaki et al., 2018; Kemp et al., 2007).
These perspectives assume that actors have distinct logics for action and enjoy relative independence in relation to their
attributed functions. Universities and research institutes, for instance, become the main actors for knowledge production,
while banks, venture capital suppliers, and insurance firms channel financial resources. However, in China, the boundaries
between the state, markets, and research innovators are not demarcated. Zheng and Huang (2018) use the term “market in
state” to describe the unique political economy of China, in which “a substantial part of the market and market mechanisms
is firmly embedded and confined within institutional mechanisms of the state” (p. 139).
Many key players in China's energy transitions are state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), operating under political guidelines
developed by the Communist Party of China (Tsang & Kolk, 2010). In 2016, among industrial enterprises above the desig-
nated size,2 SOEs accounted for 30% of the total number of firms, 58% of the total assets, and 40% of the total profits
(Wu, 2018). SOEs can substantially influence the development trajectories of the innovation system. In the new energy
vehicle industry, for instance, key enterprises are wholly or partly owned by the government (Liu & Kokko, 2013). SOEs
occupy a central position in network building, resource allocation, and market exploration. They also compete among them-
selves, as well as enable competition among regulatory agencies. They both enable the role of the public sector on innova-
tion and question the division of functions and attributions across the state and the market. Innovation clusters, circular
economy hubs, and incubators likewise tend to be government‐funded and heavily guided by public policy (Barbieri et al.,
2012).
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The most influential universities and academic centres in China operate under political guidelines (Sleeboom‐Faulkner,
2007). In 2018, there were 2,663 higher education institutions (HEIs), of which about 750 were privately owned (Ministry
of Education, 2019). In 1995, the Ministry of Education initiated “Project 211” to enhance the research capacities of high‐
level universities in China. Approximately 100 research‐oriented universities were included in the project, all public univer-
sities. The largest public research institute is the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), which has over 100 branch institutes
nationwide and hosts more than 85 percent of China's large‐scale science facilities (Zhang et al., 2019). Directly supervised
by the State Council, CAS engages in basic and applied research that addresses specific national needs and challenges. In
China's national innovation system, public research institutes and universities play an essential role in a state‐tutored pro-
cess of knowledge production and diffusion (Liu et al., 2017).
The financial system in China, particularly the banking sector, is also, to a great extent, controlled by the government. A
key feature of China's banking system is the dominance of the “Big Five” – the five largest state‐owned banks (Dong et al.,
2014). In 2018, the total assets of the “Big Five” reached 105 trillion RMB, accounting for 37% of Chinese banking assets, and
their deposit balance and loan balance accounted for 44% and 38% of the sector‐wide total, respectively (Ifeng, 2019). State
ownership of financial institutions enables political intervention in the allocation of financial resources. For example, banks'
lending practices follow political priorities (Dong et al., 2014), including government‐led initiatives of energy transitions.
The government can also create market demand for emerging technologies. SOEs are usually pioneering users of low‐
carbon technologies. In China, low‐carbon initiatives spread within the public sector (e.g., in public facilities such as hospi-
tals and schools) before expanding to the broader society. For instance, in Shenzhen, electric vehicles were first used in
public transportation (Huang & Li, 2020). In 2017, Shenzhen had electrified 100% of its public buses and 63% of the taxi
fleet, thus establishing a niche market for electric vehicles (Huang & Li, 2020). Similarly, local governments prioritised
installing solar water heaters in public buildings such as museums, stadiums, and universities, supporting the development
of the industry (Yu & Huang, 2020).
The public sector plays a substantial but also ambiguous role in shaping the energy regime and is entangled in promot-
ing, creating, and benefiting from markets in multiple ways. Scholars often encounter difficulties in distinguishing incum-
bents and challengers as conceptualised in transition frameworks. A typical example is the role of the State Grid
Corporation of China (SGCC), the largest incumbent utility company in China. Although SGCC is usually considered a
regime actor (see, for instance: Zhao et al., 2016), it has initiated many radical innovations to promote decarbonisation of
the energy system (Mah et al., 2017). Because the logics of action for different actors do not fit assumptions of state and
market distinctions, transition scholars often resort to alternative conceptualisations, such as the incumbent‐led model (Mah
et al., 2017). This demonstrates a cognitive lock‐in of transition scholars in dealing with the limitations of current transition
frameworks in explaining the uniqueness of China's energy transitions. Current theorisations of actors' logics encounter two
difficulties: the misrepresentation of state limits, as confined to a well‐defined public realm, and the underestimation of the
will of the state, a will constructed through hybridisation across actors in energy transitions.
4.3 | Recognising fragmented authoritarianism and latent forms of societal participation
In the transitions literature, China's transition is often explained as a unidirectional process of industrial innovation at scale,
under hierarchical rule from a powerful central government (Eaton & Kostka, 2014). Despite this conventional narrative of
command‐and‐control, emerging evidence suggests that innovation is a multiplex process, that central government influence
thrives in uncontrolled experimental projects of social and technical innovation (Lo & Castán Broto, 2019), and that multi-
ple actors – private and collective – influence change (Korsnes, 2014).
In transition studies, the regulatory environment is often presented as a durable backdrop against which transitions
occur. In China, the function and implementation of regulations in social processes are ambiguous. Although China's one‐
party political system has ensured the continuity and long‐term certainty of environmental policies, scholars have long
argued that legislation is not always implemented at the local level (Van Rooij, 2006). As noted by Zheng (2006), in the
West, the enactment of a policy is the end of business, while in China, a policy per se only means the beginning of busi-
ness. China's environmental governance is hence increasingly featured as fragmented authoritarianism: “command‐without‐
control” prevails in policy implementation at the local level (Wang et al., 2018). Transition governance in China is simulta-
neously hierarchical and fragmented (Cai & Aoyama, 2018). This empirical analysis is at odds with theories of transition
that celebrate coordination and alignment as symptoms of success in transition governance.
Inclusivity and participation are critical components of transformative capacity in sustainability transitions (Wittmayer &
Schäpke, 2014). In a non‐democratic environment, public participation implies radically different forms of interaction than
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those assumed in this literature. In China, multiple social interests contribute to the formulation and revision of policy
objectives and public programmes, but through obscure processes that follow different scripts and logics than those
deployed in a Western context (Westman & Castán Broto, 2019).
The role of civil society in China is deeply ambiguous. NGOs in China are often unable to fulfil roles identified in Wes-
tern society, such as political advocacy, promotion of human rights, and awareness‐raising (Zhan & Tang, 2013). If NGOs
and community organisations play a role in mediating transition dynamics in China, their rationales and modes of action
are radically different. Similarly, the conventional definition of deliberative policy processes does not fit the processes
observed within China's political system. While deliberation does occur, it operates at a micro‐level or through informal
dynamics that may be impossible to capture using the open policy dialogue approach (Frantzeskaki et al., 2018).
A different set of mechanisms exists through which society participates in the legitimation of public objectives (Huang
et al., 2020). Societal participation takes on a different form in the Chinese context because it is embedded in different
state–society relations. De Jong observes:
When the role and functioning of the state is viewed as an analogy of the way the family operates, we may
conclude that the state society relations are quite different from those developed in Western political and legal
philosophy. Rather than protecting individual citizens from state interference in their private sphere, there is
the conception of the state acting as a head of the nation leading the various segments of society to a path fol-
lowing the common good as the main yardstick. (2012, p. 18)
De Jong (2012) suggests that Confucian values, including the importance of the family, respect for authority, and an
inclination towards preserving stability, permeate praxis, psychology, and logics of decision‐making and organising govern-
ment in China. Public policy, from this perspective, reflects the common good, even though the common good has not been
formulated through an observable process of stakeholder participation or deliberation. The links between citizen demands
and political objectives are hence hardly reflected in analyses of energy transitions. However, Confucian values do not
explain the dynamics of energy transitions described above and combining this explanation with existing transition theories
is unsatisfactory. We propose an alternative theory of transitions building on social sciences traditions from China.
5 | A CULTURE‐LED THINKING ON ENERGY TRANSITIONS IN CHINA
5.1 | The societal dynamics in China: a correlative epistemology
Explanations of transitions in China are confounded because they fail to consider epistemologies and theories grounded in
Chinese worldviews. Instead, we propose the correlative epistemology as a starting point to understand transition dynamics
in China. The assumption is that a precise grasp of energy transition dynamics must engage with society's deep structures,
including the epistemological assumptions used to interpret those dynamics.
Ideas of relationality are gaining purchase among transition scholars (Castán Broto, 2019). Binz et al. (2014) note that
TISs operate through spatial relationships, networks, and relational processes that foster learning and support diffusion.
Murphy (2015) focuses on the political dynamics of transition as a form of relational place‐making. Truffer and Coenen
(2012) call for a relational understanding of actors' resource base, understanding both local nodes and global networks. A
relational perspective is also a good starting point to understand transitions and innovation in China. However, a Chinese
relational perspective is ontologically different from the relational perspective in a Western sense.
Chinese epistemology is correlative3 (Rošker, 2014). Granet (1934) first described a concrete mode of Chinese thought
as “correlative thinking.” Based on the correlative epistemology, Chinese philosophers developed a correlative cosmology
(Schwartz, 1973). As noted by Chinese philosopher Zhang Dongsun (1947), the reality of the cosmos can be viewed as a
structured order of relations. Guanxi (relation) constitutes the cornerstone of Chinese philosophies, particularly Confucian-
ism (Liang, 2004). According to Zhang, the universe is a complex network consisting of innumerable, interdependent rela-
tions connected and separated in diverse ways and distributed in uncountable levels (Rošker, 2017). The Chinese
correlative cosmology implies that no entity is independent: all entities exist in relational connections (Rošker, 2009). The
correlative cosmos can only be known within those relations.
The correlative perspective is a means to understand social and political change. Guanxi acts as the fundamental con-
stituent of Chinese society. Individuals' very existence is demonstrated foremost, not by any individual per se, but by the
guanxi network he or she is embedded in, defined by complex ethical standards that primarily originate from Confucian
thought (Hu, 1919). From a macro perspective, Confucian thinker Liang Shuming (1949) called the Chinese society an
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ethic‐based society, which, as defined by Liang, is inherently guanxi‐based. Similarly, sociologist Fei Xiaotong (1985) con-
ceptualised the Chinese guanxi‐based social structure as “chaxu geju” (a differential mode of association). Conceptually,
“chaxu geju” constitutes two dimensions. In Chinese, the meaning of “Cha” denotes the horizontal dimension, which can
be understood as a multi‐layered egocentric network, in a way similar to the ripples that appear in a lake when casting a
pebble into it (Figure 7, left). The inner circles represent stronger ties, and the outer circles weaker ties, extending from
family members to classmates, colleagues, teachers, students, friends, and acquaintances (Peng, 2004). Integral to this social
structure is also a vertical dimension (“Xu”) that represents the hierarchical social order originated from the Confucian ethi-
cal values and principles (Herrmann‐Pillath, 2016).
Chinese correlative epistemology differs substantially from the Western interpretations of relations and networks. One
epistemology is one of causality rooted in the “Philosophy of Substance” (Vandermeersch, 2017). In causal thinking, rela-
tions are understood based on entities (Di, 2020). The substance of entities defines relations, and the primary object of
recognition and comprehension is the substance of entities. In transition studies, for instance, the relational perspective
denotes the formation of a networked space through the causal agency of actors, in which the substance of each node is the
determinant factor of the overall network (Murphy, 2015). As shown in Figure 7 (right), in the Western network, nodes (in-
dividuals) and the relations they form are clearly distinguishable. Sub‐groups defined by specific categories emerge within
the network within clear borders (Herrmann‐Pillath, 2016).
Chinese philosophy does not follow the paradigm of causality (Zhang, 1947). The Chinese relational network cannot be
broken down to each node (individual) in the network (Di, 2020). Therein, guanxi can be viewed as a pre‐determined and
pre‐existing element ubiquitous in Chinese society. The logic of actor activities cannot escape the operation of guanxi.
Every individual is embedded in this complex, structured, and hierarchical guanxi network.
5.2 | Towards the correlative interpretations of energy transitions in China
The correlativeness of Chinese society ensures continuity and coherence in the relationships between the state, society, fam-
ily, and individuals. Di (2020) describes Chinese society as “a society of continuum” consisting of numerous, scalable cir-
cles of relations. In such a society, change takes place as ripples through overlapping and non‐bounded webs of relations.
Change occurs simultaneously in multiple dimensions, and thus, the energy transitions cannot be confined within any single
system, nor any specific “level.” How can the correlative epistemology offer a more holistic and nuanced interpretation of
energy transitions in China? Here we propose some analytical threads.
First and foremost, the energy transitions need to be situated within broader processes of change that are continually
unfolding in China. Because multiple systems reconfigurations occur simultaneously, energy transitions in China merely
take place alongside, and frequently as part of, the country's ongoing transformations. Analytically it becomes impossible,
if not misleading, to identify any so‐called exogenous landscape factors. Instead, correlative thinking explains how every
element of an imagined landscape or regime is interconnected with elements within and beyond the observed system. China
has a long tradition of strategic planning in national governance that sketches the country's development priorities and
long‐term visions. The construction of “transition arenas” can never be understood apart from China's overarching political
and social goals that represent the country's national priorities. A useful strategy of analysis is to identify what kinds of
FIGURE 7 The structure of Chinese and Western social networks.
Source: Adapted from Herrmann‐Pillath (2016)
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transformations are unfolding at the time of analysis and what is the position or role of the energy sector in these transfor-
mations.
Likewise, analysis on transition governance in China needs to follow a correlative logic, with sensitivity to the role of
the state. Despite the fragmented energy bureaucracy, the state's will penetrates multiple domains of energy transitions,
exercising tangible and intangible influence, but always through complex mechanisms within guanxi networks. A correla-
tive perspective transcends the dichotomy of incumbent versus challenger in transition studies, because in a “market in
state” (Zheng & Huang, 2018), the state's will extends beyond any incumbent or business interest. The correlative episte-
mology features the dynamic and dialectical relationship between niche (challenger) and regime (incumbent), mediated by
the will of the state. A correlative analysis of energy transitions envisages an open transition arena ready for different layers
of interactions to unfold. The object of analysis is guanxi, particularly the complex relations between organisational players
in the transition arena.
A correlative approach to niche formation compels the analyst to follow guanxi. Existing structures of guanxi condition
the logics of action for different actors, as well as their mindsets and common goals. Guanxi means that “who you are” (in
terms of relations) might matter more than “what you are” (substance), and this also shapes energy transitions profoundly.
In transition theories, network building is considered a central and internal process for niche formation and an essential
mechanism for up‐scaling and co‐evolution (Schot & Geels, 2008). A pioneer seeks other actors of interest to establish an
innovation network. Resources are distributed within this network, and every actor is assigned a distinct function, such as
investor, supplier, researcher, or user (see, for instance: Geels, 2002) (Figure 8, left). In a society structured by pre‐
determined social networks, a more suitable transition strategy is to find existing guanxi networks (relations such as family
members, relatives, friends, and colleagues) and mobilise them to channel resources such as knowledge, capital, labour, and
legitimacy (Figure 8, right). This is not an uncommon scenario in China's energy transitions, particularly during the early
phase of niche formation. For instance, the start‐up capital for establishing the currently largest electric vehicle manufac-
turer in China, Build Your Dreams (BYD), was borrowed by the founder Wang Chuanfu from his cousin (Chinanews,
2009). Similarly, the entrepreneurial team of solar water heater firm Sangle, one of the leading solar water heater firms in
China, was formed primarily by the founder's former colleagues from the Energy Research Institute of the Shandong Acad-
emy of Sciences (Dazhong Com, 2008).
The successful development of a niche depends on utilising or reorganising the existing network to reorient resources
rather than on creating or constructing a new network. Because niches grow within and are supported by existing guanxi
networks, a key research strategy is to map the operation of guanxi networks in niche formation and scale‐up. Until now,
transition scholars have only developed a cursory understanding of guanxi, largely confined to its facilitating role in inno-
vation diffusion and adoption. For instance, Yu and Gibbs (2018a, 2020) describe how interpersonal networks facilitated
the diffusion of solar water heaters in Dezhou. The technology diffused very quickly between acquaintances (pre‐existing
social networks). Similarly, Huang et al. (2018) observe in Rizhao how local business people used personal networks and
acquaintances for market expansion. Nevertheless, correlativeness is rarely considered a key mechanism in transition
processes. A notable exception is Sheng's (2019) in‐depth work on the role of guanxi in local green transitions in China.
FIGURE 8 A comparison of the Western and Chinese interpretations of networking in a technological niche.
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In Baoding, the development of the solar industry in the Baoding High‐tech Park originated from a deep conversation
between two friends, a local official Ma (the then director of the high‐tech park) and a solar entrepreneur Miao. The pre‐
existing mutual trust between Ma and Miao ensured effective cooperation in solar implementation, and they actively utilised
their guanxi networks to mobilise key resources (land, capital, human labour, and knowledge) that nurtured the niche for-
mation and scale‐up. Sheng's research pays special attention to the correlativeness of the Chinese society and demonstrates
the significance of guanxi in realising local green transitions in China.
Despite China's insertion in the global economy, guanxi networks and “chaxu geju” still structure Chinese society (Di,
2020). Ignoring the inherent correlative features of Chinese society generates misunderstandings and misleading interpreta-
tions, because the factors that determine critical trajectories are overshadowed by analyses that seek to identify processes of
change following models that simply do not fit empirical observations. Transition scholars struggle to frame China's case as
a sociotechnical transition “with Chinese characteristics” (e.g., the regime‐led transition model proposed by Mah et al.
(2017)). We suggest moving away from “patching up” existing transition frameworks that are inadequate to explain China
to instead thinking from within the Chinese society and Chinese culture. In particular, the correlative epistemology will help
explain the geographical diversity of energy transitions in China.
6 | CONCLUSION
The global energy system is undergoing a systematic restructuring towards more sustainable, efficient, and secure energy.
Changes are unfolding in China at an unprecedented scale and pace, with rapid mobilisation of massive financial resources
and personnel into the energy sector. China constitutes a key piece of the global renewable energy mosaic, and what hap-
pens in China will be globally relevant and influential.
Current understandings of energy transitions in China remain mired by the mismatch between assumptions of transition
frameworks and empirical realities, including the relative instability of landscapes and regimes, the ambiguous and perva-
sive role of the public sector across social domains, the blurring of public–private boundaries, and the coexistence of forms
of authoritarianism with relatively invisible processes of societal participation. These observations challenge the applicabil-
ity of transition governance approaches that emphasise democratic and inclusive policy‐making.
Transitions in China can only be understood from within a specific Chinese perspective, embedded in Chinese thought
history. The correlative epistemology is deeply rooted in the Chinese traditional philosophies, through which the universe is
viewed as a structured order of relations. Relations (guanxi), instead of individuals, are the fundamental constituents of Chi-
nese society. In a guanxi‐based society, transition actors do not build innovation networks but instead mobilise resources
within existing networks. This mechanism differs fundamentally from the assumptions of innovation networking and niche
formation that shape conventional frameworks to understand energy transitions. This approach can open the door to under-
standing the geographical diversity of transition processes in China.
Geographical inquiry can follow the lead from other fields – especially in sociology and political science – that have
already researched Chinese guanxi culture. Interviews (Wank, 1996) and questionnaire surveys (Chen et al., 2015) provide
rich data on guanxi networks. Adopting a correlative approach is a challenging task but a rewarding one. In the case of
energy transitions in China, examining guanxi networks might help to answer the question of why transitions gain momen-
tum in some places but not in others.
Transition theories “from elsewhere” (as Bridge (2018) suggested) help question the basic assumptions behind the
frameworks that explain energy transitions. For example, the correlative epistemology throws doubts on the tenets of sys-
tems thinking that ground transition theories. The inherent interconnections of guanxi networks grounded in cultural
assumptions appear to question a systems view of groups of interrelated components arranged to meet a specific purpose.
Guanxi networks are both arbitrary and determining. Do they constitute a sociotechnical system? This is the kind of ques-
tion that we hope to explore in future work. In conclusion, engaging with a theoretical framework “from elsewhere” is a
strategy to obtain better explanations of energy transitions within their geographical contexts and revisit the fundamental
tenets of dominant transition theories.
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ENDNOTES
1 Source: calculated from British Petroleum (2019).
2 According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, industrial enterprises above the designated size refer to industrial enterprises whose
main business income is above 20 million RMB.
3 We avoid using the more common term “relational epistemology” to highlight the ontological difference between China’s relational epistemol-
ogy and relational epistemology in a Western sense.
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